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Goodbye Reykjavik: international banking centres and the global financial crisis 
 
Abstract 
This empirical paper analyses how leading international banking centres (IBCs) have been faring 
under the 2008 global financial crisis. We aggregate data derived from The Banker’s annual list of the 
world’s leading banks at the city-level to map changing levels of Tier 1 capital between 2007 and 
2008 and returns on capital in 2008. The results point to a general but nonetheless variegated shift 
‘from West to East’ in the world of IBCs. The paper is concluded with a brief review of the 
implications for future research on financial geographies in general and the geographies of the 
financial crisis in particular. 
 
 
Key words 
Financial crisis, global economy, The Banker, international banking centres 
 
Introduction 
 
“Asian cities are closing in on London and New York in a ranking of competitiveness among the 
world’s leading financial centres.” This was the executive summary of the 6th edition of The Global 
Financial Centres Index (GFCI), published in September 2009. The GFCI is produced twice yearly by 
the Z/Yen Group think-tank in association with the City of London corporation, and rates major 
international financial centres in terms of ‘competitiveness’. The latter is calculated through a ‘factor 
assessment model’, which combines external indices such as office rents, airport satisfaction and tax 
rates with assessments based on responses to an online questionnaire. The September 2009 GFCI 
reveals that Singapore and Hong Kong have managed to weather the financial storm better than 
most of their leading US and European counterparts (even to the degree that they are closing in on 
London and New York), while Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing have also substantially increased their 
‘competitiveness’ during the financial crisis. Such observations are obviously in line with the 
anticipated geographical shift in the world-economy from ‘West’ to ‘East’ (e.g. Arrighi 1994; Frank 
1998; Derudder et al. 2010): the financial crisis, it would seem, is acting as a major catalyst for a 
larger geo-economic sea change.  
 This ‘West to East’ reading of the financial crisis is also evident in a recent paper by Aalbers (2009). In 
his article on ‘geographies of the financial crisis’, Aalbers (2009, 39) states that one of these 
geographies relates to the fact that  
 
“we may also see a shift in the dominance of financial centres. The financial crisis does not 
directly lead to the fall of Wall Street (New York) and The City (London), but it does 
accelerate the trend towards a shift in financial centres. There are now more secondary 
financial centres in the world and the centres of increasing importance are to be found 
outside Northern America and Europe.”  
 
Aalbers points to the rise of Hong Kong, Dubai, Shanghai, Mumbai and Singapore, but stresses that 
there will also be uneven geographies within this ‘rise of the East’ as factors such as quality of life 
and political stability are important. 
 
At the same time, however, this particular reading of the shifting geography of financial centres is 
met with considerable skepticism. The Banker, for instance, the leading international financial affairs 
publication owned by The Financial Times, recently issued a press statement in which they 
emphasized that – amidst all apparent chaos and change – it was actually pretty much business as 
usual for the leading banks, and, therefore, the financial centres in which they are located: “With so 
many banks requiring government help to shore up their capital base and many banks being forced 
to sell assets, some pundits (and banks) suspected that this year might see a seismic shift among the 
top ranks of the capital listing. Not so. Aside from three new entrants (…) the Top 25 is composed of 
much the same institutions as last year, dominated by Western banks with a sprinkling of Japanese 
and Chinese players” (The Banker 2009, 1).  
 
In their overview of the health of the world’s leading banks in 2008, The Banker does note the strong 
position of China. There are, for instance, five Chinese banks in the Top 25 by pre-tax profits, more 
than any other country (e.g. the Industrial Bank of China and China Construction Bank were the most 
profitable banks in 2008). But rather than seeing this Chinese ‘success’ as a sign of a large-scale shift 
in the geography of banking centres, The Banker notes that this uncharacteristic 2008 profitability 
should primarily be understood as a matter of sound banking rather than shifting economic and 
financial geographies: the profitable banks have been those that stuck to the basics of banking more 
than anything else – taking deposits and lending in their home markets. In other words, rather than 
an epochal shift in the geography of banking centres, The Banker suggests that – beyond a limited 
number of spectacular bankruptcies – stability has perhaps been the single most important feature 
of the geography of banks during the financial crisis. 
 
The purpose of this short empirical paper is to paint a more nuanced picture of how leading cities 
have been faring under the financial crisis. Because of the vagueness and complexity involved in the 
‘international financial centres’ (IFCs) concept, we will focus on the more narrow but less blurry 
category of ‘international banking centres’ (IBCs). To map changes in the geography of IBCs, we use 
data on key indicators of the world’s leading banks for 2007 and 2008. Rather than focusing on 
individual banks or the countries in which their headquarters are located, we aggregate indicators at 
the city-level to outline some key features of shifting IBC geographies.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next sections introduce the IBC definition 
employed in this paper and the datasets and the way in which these were transformed for the 
purposes of our analysis. We then outline the major patterns that emerge from the data analysis. The 
paper is concluded with a brief review of the implications for future research on financial 
geographies in general and the geographies of the financial crisis in particular. 
 
IFC/IBC geographies 
 
As indicated in the introduction, it is very difficult to operationalize the complex and variegated 
notion ‘international financial centre’ (IFC). In principle, IFCs represent the primary markets where 
finance capital and currency is collected, switched, disbursed and exchanged. In the last two decades, 
there has been a trend towards disintermediation in finance, which has put the importance of 
markets and investors to the fore. Because markets have largely become virtual, increasing shares of 
the day-to-day activities in IFCs are related to the management of hedge funds, private equity funds, 
pension funds, and assets rather than banking sensu strictu. More importantly, however, the 
spatiality of this diversification is uneven: cities such as Luxemburg and Dublin are dominated by 
investors, Amsterdam and Frankfurt are examples of centres dominated by banks, while London has 
a balanced share of both. To deal with this fuzziness, we restrict ourselves to one specific element of 
what makes a ‘financial centre’, i.e. headquarters of leading banks in relation to key indicators of 
their overall performance. As a consequence, rather than dealing with shifting patterns in the 
geography of IFCs per se, in this paper we will focus on the more narrow but less blurry category of 
‘international banking centres’ (IBCs).  
 
The straightforward IBC definition we adopt in this paper, therefore, is that of an agglomeration of 
banking headquarter activities in a specific location. Although less ambiguous than any 
characterization of the IFC concept, this working definition of IBCs also entails a number of potential 
ambiguities because of differences in the scale and scope of the activities that occur within these 
locations. For instance, a bank head office does not necessarily involve a large amount of 
employment. Indeed, some head offices are merely holdings locations of banks that own most of 
their assets through foreign subsidiaries, make most of their revenue outside of their home country, 
and employ most of their staff in other economies
i
. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a number of scholars 
have developed typologies of IBCs. Tschoegl (2000) reviews these typologies, which collectively lead 
him to the conclusion that IBCs should essentially be viewed as highly competitive marketplaces 
rather than ‘command bunkers’. As he observes, “with the exception perhaps of Tokyo, [there is no 
city with] headquarters of more than a handful of the world’s largest banks. At the same time, each 
of the largest centers is a host to branches or subsidiaries of almost all the world’s other major banks 
or financial firms” (Tschoegl 2000, 8).  
 
Furthermore, the straightforward focus on a specific location in space engendered by looking at head 
offices alone may obfuscate the complex spatialities of IBCs. As von Peter (2007) points out, the term 
‘centre’ in principle also suggests a notion of space that emphasizes a position in relation to other 
locations. From this perspective, IBCs should be identified based on the position they occupy in 
relation to other locations. This would lead to a range of measures in which ‘size’ per se (however 
defined) is only one indicator of a banking centre’s multifaceted dimensions. Although the best 
connected and most central locations are generally also the largest centres, an important network 
position need not come with size. And even where such network measures coincide with size, as for 
most top-tier IBCs, they may well “help explain market share: a central position attracts deposits and 
the participation of foreign banks and thereby contributes to reported size” (von Peter 2007, 43). 
Although these observations remind us of the complexity of the conceptual and empirical 
associations between size, connectivity and headquarter functionalities, the fact that these are 
somehow functionally connected (especially in leading IBCs) also implies that an analysis of key 
performance indicators of leading banks in relation to their headquarter location may shed light on 
the geography of IBCs. 
 
The Banker 1000 data set 
 
In this paper, we use data derived from The Banker’s well-known annual list of the world’s leading 
banks
ii
. Here we use the data reported in the July 2008 and July 2009 issues, which summarize the 
2007 and 2008 performances of the world’s leading banks respectively
iii
. For each year, the selection 
of banks is based on the level of Tier 1 capital, but the dataset also contains myriad other measures 
of bank strength and performance.  
The use of the level of Tier 1 capital for selecting banks is a logical choice in the world of finance, as 
this is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulator’s point of view. Tier 1 capital 
is the shareholders’ equity available to cover actual or potential losses. It is composed of core capital, 
which consists primarily of common stock, disclosed reserves and retained earnings, but excludes 
cumulative preference shares, revaluation reserves, hidden reserves, and subordinated and other 
long-term debt. There are, however, two potential problems when using (changing levels of) Tier 1 
capital to assess the impact of the financial crisis. 
 
The first potential problem is an empirical problem. The way in which Tier 1 is calculated may differ 
as each of the national banking regulators has some discretion over how to count differing financial 
instruments in a capital calculation. For instance, depending on the legal framework, Tier 1 capital 
may also include (parts of) a bank’s ‘goodwill’, an intangible asset that reflects the difference 
between the market value and selling price of a bank. In the pre-crisis era, goodwill was commonly 
deducted from Tier 1 as it does not have much (if any) liquidation value and cannot be sold by itself. 
In the course of the financial crisis, however, a number of regulators changed accounting rules so 
that (some of) the goodwill could count toward Tier 1 capital, thus helping banks toward meeting 
their regulatory capital requirements. As a consequence, Tier 1 calculations are open to some degree 
of political manipulation. To circumvent this and other possible multiplicities, The Banker uses a 
singular characterization of Tier 1 capital and other indicators of a bank’s financial prowess such as 
assets, pre-tax profits, and profit-on-capital ratioiv. 
 
The second potential problem is a conceptual one, and is related to the fact that Tier 1 capital is 
neither an unambiguous measure of ‘size’ nor are its changing levels unambiguously related to the 
crisis. Although the selection of the ‘Top 1000’ banks was based on their level of Tier 1 capital, it is 
quite difficult to simply equate this indicator with ‘size’ per se. In reality, ‘big banks’ have large 
assets, encompassing different markets and connecting different economies. Bank of America, for 
instance, ranked 1st in the 2007 edition of The Banker in terms of Tier 1 capital, is ranked only 10th in 
terms of asset size. Furthermore, as a dynamic solvability measure, changing levels of Tier 1 are 
ambiguously related to the crisis: declining solvability, for instance, can be both a sign of a bank’s 
weakness (e.g. declining liquidity levels that ultimately resulted in solvability problems for RBS and 
Fortis after the ABN AMRO takeover) and of strength (e.g., the forced takeover of Merrill Lynch by 
Bank of America)v. However, at the city level these differences between Tier 1 capital and assets are 
not empirically that important: a simple ecological correlation between both measures results in a 
very high correlation (i.e above 0.9). Thus below we follow The Banker’s lead and use Tier 1 capital 
for our comparisons. 
 
Our basic approach in this paper is to aggregate key indicators at the level of individual cities for both 
datasets. Comparing these measures for 2007 and 2008 allows us to assess the heterogeneous 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis on IBCs beyond a simple review of spectacular but highly specific 
events such as bankruptcies and mergers & acquisitions. To make the different measurements 
comparable and exclude idiosyncratic results, a number of decisions regarding data handling needed 
to be made. First, we had to exclude a number of (predominantly small) banks from the analysis 
because they reported the same data for both years. Second, we systematically checked the 
headquarter locations in the dataset because some ‘cities’ referred to specific parts of major cities 
(e.g. Giza for Cairo and Midrand for Johannesburg) and/or some cities were listed under a different 
name (e.g. Mandaluyong City and Makati City for Manila). If and when appropriate, headquarter 
locations were relabeled to enforce a coherent geographical settingvi. Third, indicators were 
aggregated at the city-level, after which we only retained cities that met at least one of two criteria: 
(i) cities with three or more headquarters in at least one of the datasets (thus including cities such as 
Reykjavik, which had three bank headquarters in the 2007 data but none in the 2008 data) and (ii) 
cities that rank in the top 25 in terms of Tier 1 capital in at least one of the datasets (thus including 
cities such as Edinburgh, which only houses two headquarters, albeit of very big banks). This resulted 
in a roster of 99 cities for further analysis. However, for reasons of clarity, our discussion will focus on 
those 52 cities that represent at least 5% of the level of Tier 1 capital of the most dominant city in 
one of the datasets (Paris in 2007 and New York in 2008). In the next section, we outline the major 
findings of our analysis. 
 
 Changing geographies of IBCs 
 
• Tier 1 changes between 2007 and 2008 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the major changes in the level of Tier 1 capital between 2007 and 
2008. The table lists the 15 largest positive and negative changes, the figure maps Tier 1 change for 
each of the 52 cities.  
 
Table 1/ Figure 1 about here 
 
The largest positive changes can be found in San Francisco, New York, Singapore, Charlotte and Abu 
Dhabi respectively. The most notable negative changes, in turn, can be found in Reykjavik, Winston-
Salem, Seoul, Munich and Manama. In some instances, these patterns of growth and decline are 
directly interrelated. The decline of Winston-Salem, for instance, can be attributed to the 
government-forced sale of Wachovia to avoid this bank’s failure. Initially ranked 19th, the bank was 
purchased by San Francisco-headquartered Wells Fargo on 31 December 2008, so that the growth of 
San Francisco directly mirrors the decline of Winston-Salem. The near-doubling of Tier 1 capital in 
New York, in turn, is primarily due to the forced entry of New York-based investment banks in The 
Banker’s list (in addition to the takeover of Washington Mutual by Morgan Chase): after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, erstwhile investment banks Goldman Sachs (ranked 13 in 2008) and 
Morgan Stanley (ranked 17 in 2008) were forced to become traditional bank holding companies from 
22 September 2008 onwards. And finally, the rise of Charlotte can be traced back to the Merrill Lynch 
acquisition by Bank of America.  
 
Other notable patterns include the strong showing of Abu Dhabi and Singapore: all banks 
headquartered in both cities reported strong growth figures. Seoul banks, in contrast, uniformly 
posted bad figures, while Munich’s position as an IBC has suffered immensely under the quasi-
collapse of two of its largest banks (Bayerische Landesbank and Hypo Real Estate). Reykjavik, in turn, 
is no longer on the map of international finance after the collapse of all three of the city’s major 
banks (Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir) following their difficulties in refinancing their short-term 
debt and a run on deposits in the United Kingdom. 
 
Taken together, the figure and the table clearly show that the most notable spatial pattern is the 
general decline of European cities: the only non-European cities recording a drop in Tier 1 capital are 
Winston-Salem, Seoul, Tokyo and Manama. Conversely, Athens is the only European city in the top 
15 cities in terms of positive Tier 1 capital change. However, this Athens exception simply points to a 
delayed reaction to the financial crisis: the major Athens-headquartered banks (National Bank of 
Greece, Alpha Bank and Piraeus) managed to record healthy performance throughout 2008 because 
of strong credit demand in Greece. However, just before the end of the year (11 December 2008), 
Moody’s Investors Service suddenly changed the outlook on these banks’ financial strength ratings 
and long-term deposit and debt ratings to negative from stable. Thus Athens  followed the path of 
other European cities shortly after the data gathering, and now finds itself in an even worse position 
as IBC.   
 
Most of the banks in the Middle Eastern centres have fared relatively well under the crisis with the 
exception of Manama. However, it can be noted that the city’s smaller banks – like most of their 
Middle Eastern counterparts - have actually had a good year in 2008, but their core capital gains are 
offset by the Tier 1 losses of Gulf International Bank. The latter bank is by far the largest Manama-
based financial institution, and the forced sale of a significant portion of its noncore international 
securities portfolio was enough to let Manama’s level of core capital take a nosedive.  
 
• Pre-tax profit performance in 2008 
 
Although banks’ profits and losses are volatile in time and space, aggregated levels of 2008 profits 
provide us with another and perhaps more forthright forecast of how the landscape of IBCs will be 
changing under the crisis. Table 2 and Figure 2 summarize aggregated pre-tax profits at the city-level. 
To properly contextualize these profits/losses, they are presented as relative measures to the level of 
Tier 1 capital contained within a city, thus generating a ‘return on capital’ ratio. The table lists the 15 
centres with the highest levels of return on capital and the 13 cities that posted the largest average 
losses. Note that the map no longer features Reykjavik, as the city’s banks have been wiped out in 
2008.   
 
Table 2/ Figure 2 about here 
 
The five cities atop this ranking are Sydney, Johannesburg, Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur and Kuwait. With 
levels of return on capital of over 25%, the banks located in these cities have continued to perform at 
pre-crisis levels (or even better). The observation that for banks located in these cities 2008 has been 
pretty much ‘business as usual’ in terms of profitability is confirmed when looking at individual 
banks: it is remarkable how virtually all of the banks located in these cities post pre-tax profit levels 
that are in line with 2007 results. In other words: the large profits of banks that have their 
headquarters in these cities are not so much the result of one or two exceptional results, but rather 
the product of an overarching stability in the performance of key financial institutions in these cities.   
The five cities representing the largest losses (in addition to Reykjavik’s demise) are Munich, 
Edinburgh, San Francisco, Zurich and Brussels. Munich’s banks (especially Bayerische Landesbank and 
Hypo Real Estate) posted losses of almost 50% of their core capital, which confirms the city’s decline 
as an IBC. In absolute terms, however, the worst losses were for Edinburgh and San Francisco-based 
banks, with Royal Bank of Scotland and Wells Fargo posting staggering 59.3 billion and 47.7 billion 
US$ losses respectively.  
 
If pre-tax profits are heralding fundamental changes in the geography of banking centres, then Figure 
2 can indeed be read as a ‘West to East’ shift. Manama and Tokyo are the only cities posting 
(relatively small) net losses in 2008, as all other losses (and especially the larger ones) are associated 
with cities in Europe and the US. Notable exceptions are the losses posted by banks headquartered in 
Stockholm, Istanbul and especially Santander. Although Santander houses more than one 
headquarter of a top 1000 bank (i.e. Caja Cantabria), its position as an IBC is almost exclusively tied 
to the activities of Banco Santander (Spain’s biggest bank, and in terms of market capitalization now 
also Europe’s biggest bank). Banco Santander was the only partner that did not suffer from liquidity 
problems after the ABN AMRO takeover, in contrast to the Edinburgh-headquartered Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Brussels-headquartered Fortis which had to be bailed out by their respective states due 
to credit shortage. Banco Santander, however, secured the takeover of ABN AMRO-owned Brazilian 
bank Banco Real without running into liquidity problems, and in addition acquired Sovereign Bancorp 
(US), Alliance & Leicester (UK) and parts of savings bank Bradford & Bingley (UK).  
 
• Typology of IBCs under the crisis 
 
Our overview of Tier changes between 2007 and 2008, and pre-tax profits in 2008, has shown that 
the IBC changes under the financial crisis are varied in geographical and substantive terms. 
Geographically, one can hardly speak of a large-scale ‘West to East’ shift given, for instance, the 
performance of Montreal/Toronto banks compared to Seoul/Manama banks. Furthermore, when 
comparing the figures and tables for both indicators and interpreting them in the light of the 
variegated meaning of changing Tier 1-levels (see above), it becomes clear that the impact of the 
crisis is also wide-ranging in terms of its effects. For instance, while the Wachovia-takeover by Wells 
Fargo boosts the Tier 1-level of San Francisco and marks the decline of Winston-Salem as a banking 
centre, it is obvious that it would be wrong to interpret 2008 as a ‘good year’ for San Francisco. On 
average, San Francisco banks posted losses that are over 20% of average Tier 1 levels, which implies 
that – in spite of enormous Tier 1 growth – the long term outlook of San Francisco as an IBC is 
perhaps less secure than before the crisis. Similarly, Kuwait-headquartered banks have managed to 
uphold their profitability during the crisis, but this does not entail a general rise of Kuwait as an IBC 
as the total level of core capital has lessened. In other words, a balanced appraisal of the impact of 
the financial crisis implies a combined appraisal of performance indicators.  
 
To this end, Table 3 presents a typology that combines both the results for Tier 1 change between 
2007 and 2008 and pre-tax profits in 2008. We distinguish three levels of Tier 1 change (gain, 
stability, loss) and four levels of return on capital (large profits, small profits, small losses, large 
losses). The 20% threshold for pre-tax profitability is based on the Banker’s (2009) assessment that in 
pre-crisis years return on capital was on average close to this level. In Figure 3, this typology is 
combined with levels of Tier 1 capital in 2008 to create a summarizing geography of IBCs in the 
context of the crisis. 
 
Table 3/ Figure 3 about here 
 
Taken together, the table and the figure reveal the complexity of the geography of IBC performance. 
There a number of obvious winners and losers: Sydney, Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, Santander, 
Montreal, Riyadh are clear-cut winners in that they combine pre-crisis levels of return on capital with 
Tier 1 growth. Moreover, it should be emphasized that – in general – in these instances capital 
growth has been less government-based than the results of the banks’ own efforts to raise their 
capital (in contrast to the Tier 1 growth of most US and European-based banks). Unambiguous losers 
are the European centres of Edinburgh, Brussels, Stuttgart and Munich: in spite of capital injections 
by governments, capital levels have plummeted, while future recovery of these cities as IBCs is 
uncertain given the enormous losses.  Most IBCs feature in the grey zone of centres that exhibit 
mixed results. For instance, cities such as New York, Stockholm, Frankfurt and Istanbul couple a 
relative stability in terms of Tier 1 capital with a relatively ‘flat’ year in terms of profitability. And 
finally, the remaining cities such as Bangkok/Johannesburg and Salt Lake City/Tokyo are relative 
winners/losers in that they combine a relatively good/bad performance on one the key indicators 
with a mediocre performance for the other indicator (e.g., Salt Lake City banks combining Tier 1 
stability with large losses and Johannesburg banks combining Tier 1 stability with large profits).    
 
  
 
 Concluding comments 
 
In this paper, we have aimed to paint a more detailed picture of the impact of the financial crisis on 
IBCs. Based on an appraisal of a combination of different key indicators (change in core capital and 
return on capital), we have shown that the geographical impact of the crisis is not simply a matter of 
a shift ‘from West to East’. Although most clear-cut winners are indeed located outside Northern 
America and Europe as suggested by Aalbers (2009), a number of Western centres such as Sydney 
and Santander are amongst the IBCs with the strongest performing banks in the unfolding crisis. 
Similarly, a number of Middle Eastern and Pacific Asian banks have gone against the overarching 
regional trend and have been dragged down by the crisis. Thus although Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and 
Dubai on the one hand and Beijing, Shanghai and Kuala Lumpur on the other hand managed to 
weather the storm because of the strong performance of banks headquartered in these cities in the 
period under investigation, one can also note the relative poor showing of Kuwait/Manama and 
Seoul/Tokyo.  
 
This systematic account of shifting IBC geographies obviously implies that other financial practices 
remain unassessed: our analysis has focused on just one element of what defines a financial centre. 
Furthermore, there are, as Engelen and Faulconbridge (2009), Lee et al. (2009), Aalbers (2009) and 
Klagge (2009) have recently highlighted, a large number of geographical puzzles associated with the 
credit crisis, and geographers are in principle well-positioned to provide nuanced accounts of the 
crisis (e.g., Hallsworth and Skinner 2008). With respect to this broader financial geography, we see 
three pertinent research agendas that may further inform the empirical analysis presented in this 
paper. 
 
First, the prominent role of governments raises a number of questions with respect to the role of the 
state in IBC-formation. The near-collapse of major Belgian banks Fortis and Dexia entailed intense 
discussions and negotiations between the Belgian and the Dutch governments on the one hand and 
the Belgian and the French governments on the other hand. On both occasions this quickly resulted 
in a break-up of the banks along ‘national lines’ and, therefore, a de facto rollback of their 
transnationalization. In other words, despite decades of European economic and financial 
integration, once the going gets tough a simplistic throwback to economic nationalism seems to be 
the only available response. As a consequence, some earlier tendencies in research on financial 
centres, whereby it was at least implicitly suggested that financial integration heralded the ‘end of 
geography’ may need a complete rethink. At the same time, the renewed role of states may well be 
exaggerated. With regulators pushing banks to increase capital, there has been feverish issuance 
activity in the capital markets, and this has often occurred through government capital injections. 
However, The Banker (2009) observes that even when government capital is removed from the 
calculations, the overall picture of rising and declining banks (and therefore IBCs) is not drastically 
altered as the banks own efforts to increase their capital were often sufficient to level most of the 
disruptions brought about by the financial crisis. In any case, future research on IBCs and financial 
centres will, once again, have to come to terms with the – potentially revamped – role of territorial 
states. 
 
Second, the financial crisis and its often disrupting effects on IBCs and financial centres provide the 
ideal background for research that tries to make sense of the patterns outlined in this paper. 
Faulconbridge (2004), for instance, has criticized earlier research on financial geographies because of 
its preoccupation with attribute properties (e.g. financial turnover, number of banks, etc.) (see also 
Faulconbridge et al. 2007; Engelen and Grote 2009). Obviously, our analysis has been based on the 
interpretation of such indicators, and this means that a lot more research needs to be done to make 
sense of the processes behind these patterns of growth and decline. This will only be possible if, as 
Faulconbridge (2004) explains in his treatise on the London/Frankfurt financial relations, one 
conceptualizes cities as part of a relational financial network. Key dimensions of shifting financial 
geographies such as the complementarity/competition between cities and the ability of key actors to 
influence the financial network from a distance need to be put centre stage if one wishes to develop 
a deeper understanding of shifting financial geographies (e.g. Beaverstock et al. 2001; Poon 2003). 
 
Third, the poor showing of Manama highlighted in this paper contradicts the strong performance of a 
number of its key financial institutions that largely operate beyond the remit of ‘classical’ finance 
(see Bassens et al. 2010). Recent research on financial geographies has suggested that much more 
attention should be paid to this existence of ‘other’, ‘non-mainstream’ circuits of financial 
intermediation and accumulation (Pollard and Samers 2007). For instance, the double-digit growth of 
the ‘Islamic financial sector’ in the last few years has challenged the idea that the rise of financial 
centres in the Gulf region can simply be understood as the result of the dissemination of Western 
capitalist practices. Although some processes and events in this region may well lend themselves to 
such an interpretation, it denies the rather commonsensical observation that globalization, 
financialization and urbanization in this part of the world have been increasingly mediated through 
Islam. Although the Islamic financial sector has also suffered from credit shortage, Bassens et al. 
(2010) suggest that it has been affected less than mainstream financial institutions. It is quite 
possible that Manama’s poor showing in our analysis may in part be the result of the fact that capital 
has been pouring into ‘other’ types of financial products that are not adequately reflected by The 
Banker’s data. For one thing, the credit crisis emphasizes the relevance of research on financial 
geographies that have long stayed under the radar because of the disproportionate focus on 
traditional financial institutions and the financial centres in which they are located. 
 
This overview of research agendas implies that a number of key issues have not been addressed in 
this short empirical paper. Furthermore, the financial crisis is obviously not an ‘event’ that can be 
isolated in time and space, but rather it is part of an on-going bundle of processes that is economic 
globalization. This means that the patterns we have identified may be deepened, altered or perhaps 
even be reversed in the coming years. Although it is hard to predict which of these future scenarios 
will come to pass, we do know that we will not be able to assess such changes unless we have a good 
empirical understanding of the shifting financial and wider corporate landscape (Taylor et al. 2009 
2010). 
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i
 As one of the reviewers pointed out, this is especially true for large multinational banks from small open 
trading economies like the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
 
ii
 For an earlier analysis of major IBCs with data from The Banker, see for example Choi et al. (2003). 
 
iii
 The data solely relate to a firm’s banking activities. In the case of bancassurance groups, for instance, the data 
reflect the banking business only.     
 
iv
 For Tier 1 capital, for instance, The Banker follows the guidelines put forward by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS).  
 
v
 Likewise, improving solvability can be a sign of strength but also of weakness if it is the result of state capital 
injections.  
 
vi
 We have taken a very restrictive stance in this exercise: our goal was not to recast cities into city-regions but 
to rectify data errors. Thus many small cities in Switzerland, Germany and the US are still listed individually.  


  
Largest positive 
change in Tier 1 
(%) 
  
Largest negative 
change in Tier 1 
(%) 
1 San Francisco 117,40 1 Reykjavik -100,00 
2 New York 89,23 2 Winston-Salem -74,44 
3 Singapore 45,84 3 Seoul -30,35 
4 Charlotte 44,91 4 Manama -20,94 
5 Abu Dhabi 40,63 5 Munich -13,44 
6 Minneapolis 37,79 6 Barcelona -12,67 
7 Beijing 33,50 7 St Petersburg -11,99 
8 Mumbai 25,14 8 Istanbul -9,05 
9 Shanghai 24,39 9 London -7,83 
10 Dubai 22,64 10 Dublin -7,76 
11 Bangkok 19,16 11 Stuttgart -6,78 
12 Athens 13,73 12 Tokyo -5,33 
13 Kuala Lumpur 13,14 13 Brussels -5,20 
14 Sydney 12,95 14 Edinburgh -5,14 
15 Melbourne 12,75 15 Kuwait -5,11 
 
Table 1: largest changes in Tier 1-level 
 
  
Largest pretax 
profits/Tier 1 
2009 (%) 
  
Largest pretax 
losses/Tier 1 
2009 (%) 
1 Sydney 29,9 1 Munich -57,6 
2 Johannesburg 29,8 2 Edinburgh -57,4 
3 Shanghai 28,0 3 San Francisco -49,2 
4 Kuala Lumpur 24,6 4 Zurich -41,4 
5 Kuwait 23,8 5 Brussels -35,3 
6 Beijing 23,5 6 Salt Lake City -32,8 
7 Santander 23,4 7 Stuttgart -20,3 
8 Montreal 21,5 8 Frankfurt -16,0 
9 Riyadh 20,6 9 New York -11,1 
10 Stockholm 19,8 10 Amsterdam -4,6 
11 Istanbul 18,5 11 Manama -3,6 
12 Bangkok 17,6 12 Tokyo -2,1 
13 Mumbai 17,0 13 Copenhagen -0,5 
14 Melbourne 16,1 14 
  15 Minneapolis 16,1 15 
   
Table 2: largest pretax profits/losses in 2008 (The Banker, 2009) 
 
 % Change in 
Tier 1 
Profits/Tier 1 2009 
>20% 0 to 20% -20% to 0% <-20% 
>5% 
 
Sydney, Shanghai, Kuala 
Lumpur, Beijing, Santander 
Montreal, Riyadh 
Bangkok, Mumbai, Melbourne, 
Minneapolis, Singapore, Dubai, 
Athens, Abu Dhabi, Toronto, 
Taipei, Charlotte, Tel Aviv 
New York Zurich, San Francisco 
-5% to 5% 
 
Johannesburg 
Stockholm, Madrid, Lisbon, Sao 
Paulo, Milan, Moscow, Paris, 
Utrecht, Vienna, Dusseldorf 
Copenhagen, Amsterdam, 
Frankfurt 
Salt Lake City 
<-5% Kuwait 
Istanbul, Barcelona, Winston-
Salem, Dublin, London, Seoul, St 
Petersburg 
Tokyo, Manama 
Stuttgart, Brussels, Edinburgh, 
Munich 
 
 Big winners 
 Winners 
 Mixed 
 Losers 
 Big Losers 
 
Table 3: a typology of IBCs in the context of the financial crisis 
 
